Prosecuting Wall Street, pt. 1 (60 minutes)
Prosecuting Wall Street, pt. 2 (60 minutes)
For a more detailed exposition of this corrupt system, Rolling Stone asks Why
Isn't Wall Street in Jail?
(emphasis mine) [my comment]
Why Isn't Wall Street in Jail?
Financial crooks
brought down the world's economy — but the feds are doing more to protect
them than to prosecute them
By Matt Taibbi
February 16, 2011 9:00 AM ET

Illustration by Victor Juhasz
Over drinks at a bar on a dreary, snowy night in Washington this past month, a
former Senate investigator laughed as he polished off his beer.
"Everything's fucked up, and
nobody goes to jail," he said. "That's your
whole story right there. Hell, you don't even have to write the
rest of it. Just write that."
I put down my notebook. "Just that?"
"That's right," he said, signaling to the waitress for the check. "Everything's
fucked up, and nobody goes to jail. You can end the piece
right there."
Nobody goes to jail. This is the mantra of
the financial-crisis era, one that saw virtually every
major bank and financial company on Wall Street embroiled in obscene criminal
scandals that impoverished millions and collectively destroyed hundreds of
billions, in fact, trillions of dollars of the world's wealth — and
NOBODY WENT TO JAIL. Nobody, that is, except Bernie Madoff, a
flamboyant and pathological celebrity con artist, whose victims happened to be
other rich and famous people.
The rest of them, ALL OF THEM, got off. Not a single
executive who ran the companies that cooked up and cashed in on the phony
financial boom — an industrywide scam that involved the mass sale of
mismarked, fraudulent mortgage-backed securities — has ever been
convicted. Their names by now are familiar to even the most casual
Middle American news consumer: companies like AIG, Goldman Sachs, Lehman
Brothers, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America and Morgan Stanley. Most of these
firms were directly involved in elaborate fraud and theft. Lehman Brothers hid
billions in loans from its investors. Bank of America lied about billions in
bonuses. Goldman Sachs failed to tell clients how it put together the
born-to-lose toxic mortgage deals it was selling. What's more, many of these
companies had corporate chieftains whose actions cost investors billions
— from AIG derivatives chief Joe Cassano, who assured investors they
would not lose even "one dollar" just months before his unit
imploded, to the $263 million in compensation that former Lehman chief Dick
"The Gorilla" Fuld conveniently failed to disclose. Yet not one of them has faced time behind bars.
Instead, federal regulators and prosecutors have let the banks and
finance companies that tried to burn the world economy to the ground get off with carefully orchestrated settlements — whitewash jobs
that involve the firms paying pathetically small fines without even being
required to admit wrongdoing. To add insult to injury, the people who
actually committed the crimes almost never pay the fines themselves; banks caught defrauding
their shareholders often use shareholder money to foot the tab of justice. "If
the allegations in these settlements are true," says Jed Rakoff, a
federal judge in the Southern District of New York, "it's
management buying its way off cheap, from the pockets of their victims."
To understand the significance of this, one has to think carefully about the efficacy of
fines as a punishment for a defendant pool that includes the richest people on
earth — people who simply get
their companies to pay their fines for them. Conversely, one has to
consider the powerful deterrent to further wrongdoing that the state is missing
by not introducing this particular class of people to the experience of
incarceration. "You put Lloyd
Blankfein in pound-me-in-the-ass prison for one six-month term, and all this
bullshit would stop, all over Wall Street," says a former congressional
aide. "That's all it would take. Just
once."
But that hasn't happened. Because the
entire system set up to monitor and regulate Wall Street is fucked up.
Just ask the people who tried to do the right thing.
Here's how regulation of Wall Street is supposed to work. To begin with,
there's a semigigantic list of public and quasi-public agencies ostensibly
keeping their eyes on the economy, a dense alphabet soup of banking, insurance,
S&L, securities and commodities regulators like the Federal Reserve, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), as well as
supposedly "self-regulating organizations" like the New York Stock
Exchange. All of these outfits, by law, can at least begin the process of
catching and investigating financial criminals, though none of them has
prosecutorial power.
The major federal agency on the Wall Street beat is the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC watches for violations like
insider trading, and also deals with so-called "disclosure
violations" — i.e., making sure that all the financial information
that publicly traded companies are required to make public actually jibes with
reality. But the SEC doesn't have prosecutorial power either, so in practice, when it looks like
someone needs to go to jail, they refer the case to the Justice Department. And since the vast
majority of crimes in the financial services industry take place in Lower
Manhattan, cases referred by the SEC often end up in the U.S. Attorney's Office
for the Southern District of New York. Thus, the
two top cops on Wall Street are generally considered to be that U.S. attorney — a job that has
been held by thunderous prosecutorial personae like Robert Morgenthau and Rudy
Giuliani — and the SEC's director
of enforcement.
The relationship between the SEC and the DOJ is necessarily
close, even symbiotic. Since financial crime-fighting requires a
high degree of financial expertise — and since the typical
drug-and-terrorism-obsessed FBI agent can't balance his own checkbook, let
alone tell a synthetic CDO from a credit default swap — the Justice
Department ends up leaning heavily on the SEC's army of 1,100 number-crunching
investigators to make their cases. In theory, it's a well-oiled, tag-team
affair: Billionaire Wall Street Asshole commits fraud, the NYSE catches on and
tips off the SEC, the SEC works the case and delivers it to Justice, and
Justice perp-walks the Asshole out of Nobu, into a Crown Victoria and off to 36
months of push-ups, license-plate making and Salisbury steak.
That's the way it's supposed to work. But a
veritable mountain of evidence indicates that when it comes to Wall
Street, the justice system
not only sucks at punishing financial criminals, it has
actually evolved into a highly effective mechanism for protecting
financial criminals. This institutional reality has absolutely
nothing to do with politics or ideology — it takes place no
matter who's in office or which party's in power. To understand how the
machinery functions, you have to start back at least a decade ago, as case
after case of financial malfeasance was pursued too slowly or not at all,
fumbled by a government bureaucracy that too often is on a first-name basis
with its targets. Indeed, the shocking pattern
of nonenforcement with regard to Wall Street is so deeply ingrained in Washington
that it raises a profound and difficult question about the very nature of our
society: whether we have created a
class of people whose misdeeds are no longer perceived as crimes, almost no matter what
those misdeeds are. The SEC and the Justice Department have evolved into a
bizarre species of social surgeon serving this nonjailable class, expert not at
administering punishment and justice, but at finding and removing criminal
responsibility from the bodies of the accused.
The systematic lack of regulation has left even the country's
top regulators frustrated. Lynn Turner, a former chief accountant
for the SEC, laughs darkly at the idea that the criminal justice system is
broken when it comes to Wall Street. "I think you've got a wrong
assumption — that we even have a law-enforcement agency when it comes to Wall
Street," he says.
In the hierarchy of the SEC, the chief accountant plays a major role in working
to pursue misleading and phony financial disclosures. Turner held the post a
decade ago, when one of the most significant cases was swallowed up by the SEC
bureaucracy. In the late 1990s, the agency had an open-and-shut case against the Rite Aid drugstore
chain, which was using diabolical accounting
tricks to cook their books. But instead of moving swiftly to crack
down on such scams, the SEC shoved the case into the "deal with it
later" file. "The Philadelphia
office literally did nothing with the case for a year," Turner recalls. "Very
much like the New York office with Madoff." The Rite Aid case
dragged on for years — and by the time it was finished, similar
accounting fiascoes at Enron and WorldCom had exploded into a full-blown
financial crisis. The same was true for another SEC case that presaged
the Enron disaster. The agency knew that appliance-maker Sunbeam was using the
same kind of accounting scams to systematically hide losses from its investors.
But in the end, the SEC's punishment for Sunbeam's CEO, Al "Chainsaw"
Dunlap — widely regarded as one of the biggest assholes in the history of
American finance — was a fine of $500,000. Dunlap's net worth at the time
was an estimated $100 million. The SEC also barred Dunlap from ever running a
public company again — forcing him to retire with a mere $99.5 million.
Dunlap passed the time collecting royalties from his self-congratulatory
memoir. Its title: Mean Business.
The pattern of inaction toward shady deals on Wall Street grew worse and worse
after Turner left, with one slam-dunk
case after another either languishing for years or disappearing altogether. Perhaps the most
notorious example involved Gary Aguirre, an SEC investigator who
was literally fired after he questioned the
agency's failure to pursue an insider-trading case against John Mack, now the chairman of
Morgan Stanley and one of America's most powerful bankers.
Aguirre joined the SEC in September 2004. Two days into his career as a
financial investigator, he was asked to look into an insider-trading complaint
against a hedge-fund megastar named Art Samberg. One day, with no advance
research or discussion, Samberg had suddenly started buying up
huge quantities of shares in a firm called Heller Financial. "It was as if Art
Samberg woke up one morning and a voice from the heavens told him to start
buying Heller," Aguirre recalls. "And he wasn't just buying shares
— there were some days when he was trying to buy three times as many
shares as were being traded that day." A few weeks later,
Heller was bought by General Electric — and
Samberg pocketed $18 million.
After some digging, Aguirre found himself focusing on one
suspect as the likely source who had tipped Samberg off: John Mack, a close friend of
Samberg's who had just stepped down as president of Morgan Stanley. At the
time, Mack had been on Samberg's case to cut him into a deal involving a
spinoff of the tech company Lucent — an investment that stood to make
Mack a lot of money. "Mack is busting my chops" to
give him a piece of the action, Samberg told an employee in an e-mail.
A week later, Mack flew to Switzerland to interview for a top job at Credit
Suisse First Boston. Among the investment bank's clients, as it happened, was a
firm called Heller Financial. We don't know for sure what Mack learned on his
Swiss trip; years later, Mack would claim that he had thrown away his notes
about the meetings. But we do know that as soon as Mack
returned from the trip, on a Friday, he
called up his buddy Samberg. The very next morning, Mack was cut into
the Lucent deal — a favor that netted
him more than $10 million. And as
soon as the market reopened after the weekend, Samberg started buying every
Heller share in sight, right before it was snapped up by GE — a suspiciously
timed move that earned him the equivalent of Derek Jeter's annual salary for
just a few minutes of work.
The deal looked like a classic case of
insider trading. But in the summer of 2005, when Aguirre told
his boss he planned to interview Mack, things
started getting weird. His boss told him the case wasn't
likely to fly, explaining that Mack had
"powerful political connections." (The investment banker
had been a fundraising "Ranger" for George Bush in 2004, and would go
on to be a key backer of Hillary Clinton in 2008.)
Aguirre also started to feel pressure from Morgan Stanley, which was in the
process of trying to rehire Mack as CEO. At first, Aguirre was contacted by the
bank's regulatory liaison, Eric Dinallo, a former top aide to Eliot Spitzer.
But it didn't take long for Morgan Stanley to work its way up the SEC chain of
command. Within three days, another of the firm's lawyers, Mary Jo White, was
on the phone with the SEC's director of enforcement. In
a shocking move that was later singled out by Senate investigators, the
director actually appeared to reassure White, dismissing the case
against Mack as "smoke" rather than "fire." White, incidentally, was herself the
former U.S. attorney of the Southern District of New York — one of the top
cops on Wall Street.
Pause for a minute to take this in. Aguirre, an SEC
foot soldier, is trying to interview a major Wall Street executive — not handcuff
the guy or impound his yacht, mind you, just talk
to him. In the course of doing so, he finds out that his target's firm is
being represented not only by Eliot Spitzer's former top aide, but by the
former U.S. attorney overseeing Wall Street, who is going four
levels over his head to speak directly to the chief of the SEC's enforcement
division — not Aguirre's boss, but his boss's boss's boss's boss. Mack
himself, meanwhile, was being represented by Gary Lynch, a former SEC director
of enforcement.
Aguirre didn't stand a chance. A month after he
complained to his supervisors that he was being blocked from interviewing Mack,
he was summarily fired, without notice.
The case against Mack was immediately dropped: all depositions canceled,
no further subpoenas issued. "It all happened
so fast, I needed a seat belt," recalls Aguirre, who had
just received a stellar performance review from his bosses. The
SEC eventually paid Aguirre a settlement of $755,000 for wrongful dismissal.
Rather than going after Mack, the SEC started looking for someone else
to blame for tipping off Samberg. (It was, Aguirre quips, "O.J.'s
search for the real killers.") It wasn't until a year later that the
agency finally got around to interviewing Mack, who denied any wrongdoing. The
four-hour deposition took place on August 1st, 2006 — just days after
the five-year statute of limitations on insider trading had expired in the
case.
"At best, the picture shows extraordinarily lax
enforcement by the SEC," Senate investigators would later
conclude. "At worse, the
picture is colored with overtones of a possible cover-up."
Episodes like this help explain why so many Wall Street executives felt
emboldened to push the regulatory envelope during the mid-2000s. Over and over,
even the most obvious cases of fraud and insider dealing got gummed up in the
works, and high-ranking
executives were almost never prosecuted for their crimes. In 2003, Freddie Mac
coughed up $125 million after it was caught misreporting its earnings by $5
billion; nobody went to jail. In 2006, Fannie Mae was fined $400 million, but
executives who had overseen phony accounting techniques to jack up their
bonuses faced no criminal charges. That same year, AIG paid $1.6
billion after it was caught in a major accounting scandal that would indirectly
lead to its collapse two years later, but no
executives at the insurance giant were prosecuted.
All of this behavior set the stage for the crash of 2008, when Wall Street
exploded in a raging Dresden of fraud and criminality. Yet the
SEC and the Justice Department have shown almost no inclination to prosecute
those most responsible for the catastrophe — even
though they had insiders from the two firms whose implosions triggered the
crisis, Lehman Brothers and AIG, who
were more than willing to supply evidence against top executives.
In the case of Lehman Brothers, the SEC had a chance six months before
the crash to move against Dick Fuld, a man recently named the worst CEO of all
time by Portfolio magazine. A
decade before the crash, a Lehman lawyer named Oliver Budde was going through
the bank's proxy statements and noticed that it was using a loophole involving
Restricted Stock Units to hide tens of millions of dollars of Fuld's
compensation. Budde told his bosses that Lehman's use of RSUs was dicey at
best, but they blew him off. "We're sorry about your concerns," they
told him, "but we're doing it." Disturbed by such shady practices,
the lawyer quit the firm in 2006.
Then, only a few months after Budde left Lehman, the SEC changed its rules to
force companies to disclose exactly how much compensation in RSUs executives
had coming to them. "The SEC was basically like, 'We're sick and tired of
you people fucking around — we want a picture of what you're
holding,'" Budde says. But instead of coming clean about eight separate
RSUs that Fuld had hidden from investors, Lehman filed a proxy statement that
was a masterpiece of cynical lawyering. On one page, a chart indicated that
Fuld had been awarded $146 million in RSUs. But two pages later, a note in the
fine print essentially stated that the chart did not contain the real number
— which, it failed to mention, was actually $263 million more than the
chart indicated. "They fucked
around even more than they did before," Budde says. (The law
firm that helped craft the fine print, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, would
later receive a lucrative federal contract to serve as legal adviser to the
TARP bailout.)
Budde decided to come forward. In April 2008, he
wrote a detailed memo to the SEC about Lehman's history of hidden stocks. Shortly thereafter, he
got a letter back that began, "Dear Sir or Madam." It was an
automated e-response.
"They blew me off," Budde says.
Over the course of that summer, Budde tried to contact the SEC several more times, and was
ignored each time. Finally, in the fateful week of September
15th, 2008, when Lehman Brothers cracked under the weight of its reckless bets
on the subprime market and went into its final death spiral, Budde became
seriously concerned. If the government tried to arrange for Lehman to be pawned
off on another Wall Street firm, as it had done with Bear Stearns, the U.S.
taxpayer might wind up footing the bill for a company with hundreds of millions
of dollars in concealed compensation. So Budde again called the SEC, right in
the middle of the crisis. "Look," he told regulators.
"I gave you huge stuff. You really want to take a look at this."
But the feds once again blew him off. A young staff attorney
contacted Budde, who once more provided the SEC with copies of all his memos.
He never heard from the agency again.
"This was like a mini-Madoff," Budde says. "They
had six solid months of warnings. They could have done something."
Three weeks later, Budde was shocked to see Fuld testifying
before the House Government Oversight Committee and whining about how poor he
was. "I got no severance, no golden parachute," Fuld moaned. When
Rep. Henry Waxman, the committee's chairman, mentioned that he thought Fuld had earned more
than $480 million, Fuld
corrected him and said he believed it
was only $310 million.
The true number, Budde calculated, was
$529 million. He contacted a Senate investigator to
talk about how Fuld had misled Congress, but he never got
any response. Meanwhile, in a demonstration of the government's
priorities, the Justice Department is proceeding full force with a
prosecution of retired baseball player Roger Clemens for lying to Congress
about getting a shot of steroids in his ass. "At
least Roger didn't screw over the world," Budde says, shaking his
head.
Fuld has denied any wrongdoing, but his hidden compensation was only a
ripple in Lehman's raging tsunami of misdeeds. The
investment bank used an absurd accounting trick called "Repo 105"
transactions to conceal $50 billion in loans on the firm's balance sheet. (That's $50 billion, not million.) But more than a
year after the use of the Repo 105s came to light, there
have still been no indictments in the affair. While it's possible
that charges may yet be filed, there are now rumors
that the SEC and the Justice Department may take no action against Lehman. If that's true, and there's no
prosecution in a case where there's such overwhelming evidence — and where the
company is already dead, meaning it can't dump further losses on investors or
taxpayers — then it might be time
to assume the game is up. Failing to prosecute Fuld and Lehman
would be tantamount to the state marching into Wall Street and waving the green
flag on a new stealing season.
The most amazing noncase in the entire crash — the one that
truly defies the most basic notion of justice when it comes to Wall Street
supervillains — is the one involving AIG and Joe
Cassano, the nebbishy Patient Zero of the financial crisis. As chief of AIGFP, the
firm's financial products subsidiary, Cassano repeatedly made public statements
in 2007 claiming that his portfolio of mortgage derivatives would suffer
"no dollar of loss" — an almost comically obvious
misrepresentation. "God couldn't manage a $60 billion real estate
portfolio without a single dollar of loss," says Turner, the agency's
former chief accountant. "If the SEC can't
make a disclosure case against AIG, then they might as well close up
shop."
As in the Lehman case, federal prosecutors
not only had plenty of evidence against AIG — they
also had an eyewitness to Cassano's actions who was prepared to tell all. As an accountant at
AIGFP, Joseph St. Denis had a number of run-ins with Cassano during the summer
of 2007. At the time, Cassano had already made nearly $500 billion worth of
derivative bets that would ultimately blow up, destroy the world's largest
insurance company, and trigger the largest government bailout of a single
company in U.S. history. He made many fatal mistakes, but chief among them was
engaging in contracts that required AIG to post billions of dollars in
collateral if there was any downgrade to its credit rating.
St. Denis didn't know about those clauses in Cassano's contracts, since they
had been written before he joined the firm. What he did know was that Cassano freaked
out when St. Denis spoke with an accountant at the parent company, which was only just
finding out about the time bomb Cassano had set. After St. Denis finished a
conference call with the executive, Cassano suddenly burst into the room and
began screaming at him for talking to the New York office. He then announced
that St. Denis had been "deliberately excluded" from any valuations
of the most toxic elements of the derivatives portfolio — thus preventing
the accountant from doing his job. What St. Denis represented was
transparency — and the last thing
Cassano needed was transparency.
Another clue that something was amiss with AIGFP's portfolio came when Goldman
Sachs demanded that the firm pay billions in collateral, per the terms of
Cassano's deadly contracts. Such "collateral calls" happen all the
time on Wall Street, but seldom against a seemingly solvent and
friendly business partner like AIG. And
when they do happen, they are rarely paid without a fight. So St. Denis was
shocked when AIGFP agreed to fork over
gobs of money to Goldman Sachs, even while it was still
contesting the payments — an indication that something was
seriously wrong at AIG. "When I found out about
the collateral call, I literally had to sit down," St. Denis recalls. "I
had to go home for the day."
After Cassano barred him from valuating the derivative deals, St. Denis had no
choice but to resign. He got another job, and thought he was done with AIG. But
a few months later, he learned that Cassano had held a conference call with
investors in December 2007. During the call, AIGFP
failed to disclose that it had posted $2 billion to Goldman Sachs following the
collateral calls.
"Investors therefore did not
know," the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
would later conclude, "that AIG's
earnings were overstated by $3.6 billion."
"I remember thinking, 'Wow, they're just not telling
people,'" St. Denis says. "I knew. I had been there. I knew
they'd posted collateral."
A year later, after the crash, St. Denis wrote a letter about his
experiences to the House Government Oversight Committee, which was looking into
the AIG collapse. He also met with
investigators for the government, which was preparing a
criminal case against Cassano. But the case never went to court. Last May, the
Justice Department confirmed that it would not file charges against executives
at AIGFP. Cassano, who has denied any wrongdoing,
was reportedly told he was no longer a target.
Shortly after that, Cassano strolled into Washington to
testify before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. It was his first public
appearance since the crash. He has not had to pay back a single cent out of the
hundreds of millions of dollars he earned selling his insane pseudo-insurance
policies on subprime mortgage deals. Now, out from under prosecution, he
appeared before the FCIC and had the enormous balls to compliment his own
business acumen, saying his atom-bomb swaps portfolio was, in retrospect, not
that badly constructed. "I think the portfolios are withstanding the test
of time," he said.
"They offered him an excellent opportunity to redeem himself," St.
Denis jokes.
In the end, of course, it wasn't just the executives of Lehman
and AIGFP who got passes. Virtually every
one of the major players on Wall Street was similarly embroiled in scandal, yet their
executives skated off into the sunset, uncharged and unfined. Goldman Sachs paid $550
million last year when it was caught defrauding investors with crappy
mortgages, but no executive has been fined or jailed — not even Fabrice
"Fabulous Fab" Tourre, Goldman's outrageous Euro-douche who gleefully
e-mailed a pal about the "surreal" transactions in the middle of a
meeting with the firm's victims. In a similar case, a sales executive at the
German powerhouse Deutsche Bank got off on charges of insider trading; its
general counsel at the time of the questionable deals, Robert Khuzami, now
serves as director of enforcement for the SEC.
Another major firm, Bank of America, was
caught hiding $5.8 billion in bonuses from shareholders as part of its takeover
of Merrill Lynch. The SEC tried to let the bank off with a
settlement of only $33 million,
but Judge Jed Rakoff rejected the action as a "facade of
enforcement." So the SEC quintupled the settlement — but it didn't
require either Merrill or Bank of America to admit to wrongdoing. Unlike
criminal trials, in which the facts of the crime are put on record for all to
see, THESE WALL STREET SETTLEMENTS ALMOST NEVER
REQUIRE THE BANKS TO MAKE ANY FACTUAL DISCLOSURES, effectively burying the
stories forever. "All this is done at the expense
not only of the shareholders, but also of the truth," says Rakoff. Goldman,
Deutsche, Merrill, Lehman, Bank of America ... who did we leave out? Oh, there's Citigroup,
nailed for hiding some $40 billion in liabilities from investors. Last July, the SEC
settled with Citi for $75 million. In a rare move, it also fined two Citi
executives, former CFO Gary Crittenden and investor-relations chief Arthur
Tildesley Jr. Their penalties, combined, came to a whopping $180,000.
Throughout the entire crisis, in fact, the government has
taken exactly one serious swing of the bat against executives from a major
bank, charging two guys from Bear Stearns with criminal fraud over
a pair of toxic subprime hedge funds that blew up in 2007, destroying the
company and robbing investors of $1.6 billion. Jurors had an
e-mail between the defendants admitting that "there is simply no way for us to make money — ever"
just three days before assuring investors that "there's no basis for thinking this is one big disaster."
Yet THE CASE STILL SOMEHOW
ENDED IN ACQUITTAL — and the
Justice Department hasn't taken any of the big banks to court since.
All of which raises an obvious question: Why
the hell not?
Gary Aguirre, the SEC investigator who lost his job when he drew the ire of
Morgan Stanley, thinks he knows the answer.
Last year, Aguirre noticed that a conference on financial law
enforcement was scheduled to be held at the Hilton in New York on November
12th. The list of attendees included 1,500 or so of the country's
leading lawyers who represent Wall Street, as well as some of the government's
top cops from both the SEC and the Justice Department.
Criminal justice, as it pertains to the Goldmans and Morgan
Stanleys of the world, is not adversarial combat, with cops and
crooks duking it out in interrogation rooms and courthouses. Instead, it's
a cocktail party between friends and colleagues who from month to month
and year to year are constantly switching sides and trading hats. At the Hilton
conference, regulators and banker-lawyers rubbed elbows during a series of
speeches and panel discussions, away from the rabble. "They were chummier
in that environment," says Aguirre, who plunked down $2,200 to attend the
conference.
Aguirre saw a lot of familiar faces at the conference, for a simple reason: Many
of the SEC regulators he had worked with during his failed attempt to
investigate John Mack had made a million-dollar pass through the Revolving
Door, going to work for the very same firms they used to police.
Aguirre didn't see Paul Berger, an associate director of enforcement who had
rebuffed his attempts to interview Mack — maybe because Berger was tied
up at his lucrative new job at Debevoise & Plimpton, the same law firm that
Morgan Stanley employed to intervene in the Mack case. But he did see Mary Jo
White, the former U.S. attorney, who was still at Debevoise & Plimpton. He
also saw Linda Thomsen, the former SEC director of enforcement who had been so
helpful to White. Thomsen had gone on to represent Wall Street as a partner at
the prestigious firm of Davis Polk & Wardwell.
Two of the government's top cops were there as well: Preet Bharara, the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New
York, and Robert Khuzami, the
SEC's current director of enforcement. Bharara had been
recommended for his post by Chuck Schumer, Wall Street's favorite senator. And
both he and Khuzami had served with Mary Jo White at the U.S. attorney's
office, before Mary Jo went on to become a partner at Debevoise. What's more,
when Khuzami had served as general counsel for Deutsche Bank, he had been hired
by none other than Dick Walker, who had been enforcement director at the SEC
when it slow-rolled the pivotal fraud case against Rite Aid.
"It wasn't just one rotation of the revolving
door," says Aguirre. "It
just kept spinning. Every single person had rotated in and out of government
and private service."
The Revolving Door isn't just a footnote in financial law enforcement; over the
past decade, more than a dozen high-ranking SEC officials have
gone on to lucrative jobs at Wall Street banks or white-shoe law firms,
where partnerships are worth millions. That makes SEC
officials like Paul Berger and Linda Thomsen the equivalent of college
basketball stars waiting for their first NBA contract. Are you really going to
give up a shot at the Knicks or the Lakers just to find out whether a Wall
Street big shot like John Mack was guilty of insider trading? "You take one
of these jobs," says Turner, the former chief accountant
for the SEC, "and you're fit for life."
Fit — and happy. The banter between the speakers at the
New York conference says everything you need to know about the level of chumminess and mutual admiration that
exists between these supposed adversaries of the justice system. At one point in the
conference, Mary Jo White introduced Bharara, her old pal from the U.S.
attorney's office.
"I want to first say how pleased I am to be here," Bharara responded.
Then, addressing White, he added, "You've spawned all of us. It's almost
11 years ago to the day that Mary Jo White called me and asked me if I would
become an assistant U.S. attorney. So thank you, Dr. Frankenstein."
Next, addressing the crowd of high-priced lawyers from Wall Street, Bharara
made an interesting joke. "I also want to take a moment to
applaud the entire staff of the SEC for the really amazing things they have
done over the past year," he said. "They've done
a real service to the country, to the financial community, and not to mention a
lot of your law practices."
Haw! The line drew snickers from
the conference of millionaire lawyers. But the real fireworks
came when Khuzami, the SEC's director of enforcement, talked about a new
"cooperation initiative" the agency had recently unveiled, in which executives are
being offered incentives to report fraud they have witnessed or committed. From
now on, Khuzami said, when
corporate lawyers like the ones he was addressing want to know if their Wall
Street clients are going to be charged by the Justice Department before deciding whether
to come forward, all they have to do is
ask the SEC.
"We are going to try to get those individuals answers," Khuzami
announced, as to "whether or not there is criminal interest in the case
— so that defense counsel can have as much
information as possible in deciding whether or not to choose to sign up their
client."
Aguirre, listening in the crowd, couldn't believe Khuzami's brazenness. The
SEC's enforcement director was saying, in essence, that
firms like Goldman Sachs and AIG and Lehman Brothers will henceforth be able to
get the SEC to act as a middleman between them and the Justice Department,
negotiating fines as a way out of jail time. Khuzami was basically outlining
a four-step system for banks and their executives to buy their way out of
prison. "First, the SEC and Wall Street player make an agreement
on a fine that the player will pay to the SEC," Aguirre says. "Then the
Justice Department commits itself to pass, so that the player knows he's
'safe.' Third, the player pays the SEC — and fourth, the player gets a
pass from the Justice Department." [wow]
When I ask a former federal prosecutor about the
propriety of a sitting SEC director of enforcement talking out loud about
helping corporate defendants "get answers" regarding the status of
their criminal cases, he initially doesn't believe it. Then I
send him a transcript of the comment. "I am very, very surprised by
Khuzami's statement, which does seem to me to be contrary to past practice — and
not a good thing," the former prosecutor says.
Earlier this month, when Sen. Chuck Grassley found out about Khuzami's
comments, he sent the SEC a letter noting that the
agency's own enforcement manual not only prohibits such "answer
getting," it even bars the SEC from giving defendants the Justice
Department's phone number. "Should counsel or the individual ask which
criminal authorities they should contact," the manual reads, "staff
should decline to answer, unless authorized by the relevant criminal
authorities." Both the SEC and the
Justice Department deny there is anything improper in their new policy of
cooperation. "We collaborate with the SEC, but
they do not consult with us when they resolve their cases," Assistant
Attorney General Lanny Breuer assured Congress in January. "They do that
independently."
Around the same time that Breuer was testifying, however, a story broke that
prior to the pathetically small settlement of $75 million that the SEC had
arranged with Citigroup, Khuzami had ordered
his staff to pursue lighter charges against the megabank's executives. According to a letter
that was sent to Sen. Grassley's office, Khuzami had a
"secret conversation, without telling the staff, with a prominent
defense lawyer who is a good friend" of his and "who was
counsel for the company." The unsigned letter, which appears to have come
from an SEC investigator on the case, prompted the inspector general to launch
an investigation into the charge.
All of this paints a disturbing picture
of A CLOSED AND CORRUPT SYSTEM, a timeless circle of friends that
virtually guarantees a collegial approach to the policing of high finance. Even
before the corruption starts, the state is crippled by economic reality: Since law enforcement
on Wall Street requires serious intellectual firepower, the banks seize a huge
advantage from the start by hiring away the top talent. Budde, the former
Lehman lawyer, says it's well known that all the best legal minds go to the big
corporate law firms, while the "bottom 20 percent go to the SEC."
Which makes it tough for the agency to track devious legal machinations, like
the scheme to hide $263 million of Dick Fuld's compensation.
"It's such a mismatch, it's not even funny," Budde says.
But even beyond that, the system is skewed by the irrepressible pull of riches
and power. If talent rises in the SEC or the Justice Department, it
sooner or later jumps ship for those fat NBA contracts. Or, conversely, graduates of the
big corporate firms take sabbaticals from their rich lifestyles to slum it in
government service for a year or two. Many of those appointments are inevitably
hand-picked by lifelong stooges for Wall Street like Chuck Schumer, who has
accepted $14.6 million in campaign contributions from Goldman Sachs, Morgan
Stanley and other major players in the finance industry, along with their
corporate lawyers.
As for President Obama, what is there to be said? Goldman
Sachs was his number-one private campaign contributor. He put a Citigroup executive
in charge of his economic transition team, and he just named an executive of JP
Morgan Chase, the proud owner of $7.7 million in Chase stock, his new chief of
staff. "The betrayal that this represents by Obama to everybody
is just — we're not ready to believe it," says Budde, a classmate
of the president from their Columbia days. "He's really fucking us over
like that? Really? That's really a JP Morgan guy, really?"
Which is not to say that the Obama era has meant an end to law enforcement. On
the contrary: In the past few years, the administration has allocated massive amounts of
federal resources to catching wrongdoers — of a certain type. Last year, the
government deported 393,000 people, at a cost of $5 billion. Since 2007, felony
immigration prosecutions along the Mexican border have surged 77 percent;
nonfelony prosecutions by 259 percent. In Ohio last month, a single mother was
caught lying about where she lived to put her kids into a better school
district; the judge in the case tried to sentence her to 10 days in jail for
fraud, declaring that letting her go free would "demean the
seriousness" of the offenses.
So there you have it. Illegal immigrants: 393,000. Lying moms:
one. Bankers: zero. The math makes sense
only because the politics are so obvious. You want to win elections, you bang
on the jailable class. You build prisons and fill them with people for selling
dime bags and stealing CD players. But for stealing a billion dollars? For
fraud that puts a million people into foreclosure? Pass. It's
not a crime. Prison is too harsh. Get them to say
they're sorry, and move on. Oh, wait — let's
not even make them say they're sorry. That's too mean; let's just give
them a piece of paper with a government stamp on it, officially clearing them
of the need to apologize, and make them pay a fine instead. But don't make them pay
it out of their own pockets, and don't ask them to give back the money they
stole. In fact, let them profit from their collective crimes, to the tune of a
record $135 billion in pay and benefits last year. What's next? Taxpayer-funded massages for every Wall Street
executive guilty of fraud?
The mental stumbling block, for most Americans, is that financial crimes don't
feel real; you don't see the culprits waving guns in liquor stores or dragging
coeds into bushes. But these frauds are worse
than common robberies. They're crimes of intellectual choice,
made by people who are already rich and who have every conceivable social
advantage, acting on a simple, cynical calculation: Let's steal
whatever we can, then dare the victims to find the juice to reclaim their money
through a captive bureaucracy. They're attacking the very definition of
property — which, after all, depends in part on a legal system
that defends everyone's claims of ownership equally. When that definition
becomes tenuous or conditional — when the state simply gives up on the
notion of justice — this whole American
Dream thing recedes even further from reality.
My reaction: I don’t really have much to add
to all this. The corruption speaks for itself.

Why would anyone in the SEC or DOJ make a serious effort to prosecute a future potential employer? Or maybe the people at the DOJ realize that the immense financial resources at the disposal of Wall Street could be used to conduct smear campaigns or other nefarious means of attacking an individual investigating the wrongdoing - i.e. Gary Allen?
You're getting distracted Eric. Everybody knows the system is corrupt. Focus on exposing the fraud where you have invested funds affected ie agriculture. Another BS USDA report last night ... they have no fear of being exposed. Given MF Global has gone and was probably one of the largest broking houses utilised by farmers for hedging prices (that is selling only), you can guarantee many farmers will now reassess using futures to manage prices in the future. So in the future when you go to take delivery of your corn, you may find there is only a printed paper promise waiting for you ...